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NOT JUST A FEW BAD APPLES: THE 
PROSECUTION OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The manifestation of mass atrocities throughout the world requires that 
their collective nature be understood and that criminal jurisprudence 
evolve to recognize the criminal accountability of groups as well as the 
individual perpetrators.1 Collective violence is especially problematic 
when it involves government and military leaders; thus, “leaders and those 
in superior positions in the chain of command are, owing to their positive 
governance obligations, more deserving of prosecution and weightier 
punishment for their involvement in mass atrocity.”2 International criminal 
law has begun to develop methods of accounting for collective liability by 
utilizing the theories of command responsibility and joint criminal 
enterprise—theories that prove beneficial when attempting to prosecute 
crimes involving “difficulties in establishing precise facts and evidentiary 
linkages . . . [and a] complex sequencing of administrative directives. . . .”3 
The recent atrocities that have occurred in U.S. detention facilities in 
Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provide a situation in which the 
theories of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise could be 
utilized to achieve convictions not possible with more traditional theories 
of liability—convictions that are necessary to counter the rise of collective 
violence in the world.4  
Many allegations, ranging from inhumane treatment to torture, have 
arisen from the U.S. detainee operations following “Operation Enduring 
 1. For an excellent discussion, see generally Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 568 (citing Richard J. Goldstone, The International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: A Case Study in Security Council Action, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 5, 7 (1995)). 
 3. Id. at 574. 
 4. Leaders hold a power of persuasion over lower ranking members of the military hierarchy. It 
is necessary to hold them accountable for their actions so that this power of persuasion is limited to the 
appropriate use of the military. In the words of one commentator: 
Just as dynamic military commanders can induce their subordinates to accomplish heroic acts 
beyond the pale of traditional human limitations, they also, unfortunately, possess the power 
and means of ordering, encouraging, or acquiescing to, acts that are inhuman in the extreme. 
Through an abuse of legitimate military leadership and authority, a commander may condone, 
or even direct, conduct that goes far beyond even the relaxed standards of acceptable violence 
associated with warfare. Under the direction of persuasive leadership, soldiers have 
committed acts so atrocious as to exceed any possible rational application of military force.  
Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary 
Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2000). 
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Freedom” in Afghanistan and “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”5 Distinguishing 
between torture and inhuman treatment is a matter of degree6 and much of 
the existing body of law applies to both. This Note does not discuss the 
distinction between torture and inhuman treatment; rather, it assumes that 
U.S. practice during detainee interrogations has, on occasion, risen to the 
level of torture.7 While the policy of President Bush to hold disciplinary 
proceedings for the “aberrant individuals” who participated in flagrant 
violations of international law is commendable, liability extends far 
beyond the low-ranking personnel working the late-shift at Abu Ghraib 
prison.8 In fact, the individual actions were sponsored, condoned, 
acquiesced to, or ignored by high-ranking members of the U.S. military 
and government.9 Such activity cannot be ignored.  
This Note first focuses upon the international and domestic 
prohibitions on torture. A discussion of the use of torture and attempted 
justifications for such use will then follow. This Note will conclude with 
 5. See generally REED BRODY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (June 
2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
“ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB”]; JOHN SIFTON, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM: ABUSES BY 
U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN (Mar. 2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/ 
afghanistan0304.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter “ENDURING FREEDOM”]; INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE 
TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (Feb. 
2004), http://www.stopwar.org.uk/new/news/articles/icrc.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 
“ICRC REPORT”]. 
 6. The General Assembly of the United Nations has defined torture as “an aggravated and 
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Annex, art. 1(2), U.N. Doc. 
A/10408 (Dec. 9, 1975), reprinted in U.N.Y.B. 624, U.N. Sales No. E.76.IV.2. The European Court of 
Human Rights has defined torture as “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering.” Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25, 66 (1976); Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. on Judgments & Decisions, 1996–VI, 2260, 2279 (1997); Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Rep. on Judgements & Decisions 1997–VI, 1866, 1891 (1998). 
 7. Even if the actions of U.S. military and civilian personnel did not rise to the level of torture, 
the actions would still constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and, thus, would still be 
banned by international and national law. See infra notes 68–91 and accompanying text (discussing the 
applicability of domestic and international law banning torture, which also bans cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment). 
 8. See Beth Potter, Reservist Pleads Guilty in Prison Scandal, Oct. 21, 2004, USA TODAY, at 
A1 (“the Bush administration sought to blame the abuse on a small number of low ranking ‘bad 
apples’”); Remember Abu Ghraib?, Oct. 15, 2004, WASH. POST, at A22 (stating that “the president 
maintained that the abuse was the responsibility of a few low-ranking soldiers working the night 
shift”).  
 9. “[A] pentagon appointed panel has found responsibility at senior levels of the Pentagon, the 
Justice Department and the White House.” Remember Abu Ghraib?, supra note 8, at A22. A 
discussion of this evidence and the governmental policy it supports will occur in Parts III and IV. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/7
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an analysis of the utility of the theories of command responsibility and 
joint criminal enterprise to the allegations that have been asserted.10  
I. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PROHIBITIONS ON TORTURE 
A. International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed 
conflict, arose from two bodies of law that are interrelated: the 1907 
Hague Conventions11 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.12 Hague 
Convention IV governs the modalities of armed conflict,13 while four of 
the Geneva Conventions focus upon the treatment of persons during armed 
conflict.14 This Note will focus upon the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions that protect persons15 from torture.16 Each of the four Geneva 
 10. While the jurisdictional issues involved in such a prosecution would constitute a fascinating 
study of international and domestic law, such a study is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 11. For the relevant Hague Convention, see infra note 13. 
 12. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), para. 75, at 256. 
See infra note 14. 
 13. Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Annex: 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 
539, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter “Hague Convention IV”]. Violations 
of Hague Convention IV were subject to reparation payments by the State Party that violated the 
convention. Id. art. 3. 
 14. The four relevant Geneva Conventions are: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/ 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter “Geneva Convention I”]; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces 
at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), 
available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) [hereinafter “Geneva 
Convention II”]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for 
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), available at 
http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter “Geneva Convention 
III”]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War opened for 
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), available at 
http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter “Geneva Convention 
IV”]. 
 15. Geneva Conventions I through IV protect the following persons: the wounded and sick in the 
armed forces in the field, Geneva Convention I, supra note 14, art. 3(1)(a); the wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea, Geneva Convention II, supra note 14, arts. 3, 12, and 
51; prisoners of war, Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, arts. 3, 17 and 87; and civilians, Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 14, arts. 3 and 32. For the purposes of this Note, only the provisions 
relative to prisoners of war and civilians present in Geneva Convention III and Geneva Convention IV 
will be discussed. 
 16. Geneva Convention III mandates that “[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.” 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, art. 17. In addition, “prisoners of war who refuse to answer 
may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Conventions holds that torture is a grave breach of the Conventions and is 
subject to universal jurisdiction.17 Geneva Convention III applies to 
prisoners of war18 and Geneva Convention IV applies to persons “who at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of 
a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”19 When the status of 
individuals is uncertain, they must be afforded the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions until such time as their status can be determined.20 
Therefore, all persons initially detained during a conflict, or occupation, 
are to be afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions and must not 
be subjected to torture.21 The international community further affirmed the 
Id. Furthermore, Geneva Convention III states, “[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely 
treated” and that “any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously 
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a 
serious breach of the present Convention.” Id. art. 13. Additionally, “prisoners of war must at all times 
be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public 
curiosity.” Id. While Geneva Convention III only explicitly accounts for a prohibition on physical and 
mental torture during the pursuit of information, the humane treatment required by article 13 prohibits 
torture as torture necessarily involves inhumane treatment. Geneva Convention IV does not 
specifically limit the prohibition on torture to the pursuit of information. Rather, article 32 prohibits 
parties to the convention from “taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical 
suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands . . . [including] torture, corporal 
punishment, mutilation . . . [and] any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or 
military agents.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 32. 
 17. Torture and inhuman treatment are included in the list of grave breaches. Geneva Convention 
I, supra note 14, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 14, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra 
note 14, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 147. Penal sanctions and mandatory 
universal jurisdiction are also established. Geneva Convention I, supra note 14, art. 49; Geneva 
Convention II, supra note 14, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, art. 129; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 146. 
 18. The issue of who may be classified as a prisoner of war is a complicated one. Geneva 
Convention III states that prisoners of war are “members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, 
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such forces.” Geneva Convention III, 
supra note 14, art. 4(A)(1). Additionally, organized resistance movements and other militias or 
volunteer corps who are captured may be classified as prisoners of war and be covered by the 
conventions if they are have a commander, have a group insignia, are “carrying arms openly,” and are 
“conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”. Id. art. 4(A)(2). 
Furthermore, if the combatants’ government is not recognized by another Party to the conflict they are 
still accorded prisoner of war status under the convention. Id. art. 4(A)(3). Finally, persons not 
belonging to the armed forces, but who accompany them, are also protected under this convention. Id. 
art. 4(A)(4). 
 19. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 4. However, the convention also states that 
“nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it.” Id.  
 20. Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, art. 5. “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons 
. . . belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of 
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” 
Id. 
 21. When the status of an individual has been determined and it has been found that the Geneva 
Convention protections apply, the protections are in force until “the general close of military 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/7
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principles enumerated in the Geneva Conventions by codifying the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.22 
B. International Human Rights Law 
While international humanitarian law is the lex specialis that governs 
the law of armed conflicts, international human rights law continues to 
apply in wartime; therefore, the difficulties in applying the Geneva 
Conventions are overcome by the prohibition of torture explicit in 
international human rights law. The principles of international human 
rights law can be best seen by looking to the treaties and agreements that 
have been entered into relating to the practice of torture.23 In 1984, the 
international community strengthened the prohibition on torture by 
operations.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 6. Furthermore, the protection afforded during 
an armed conflict shall continue for “one year after the general close of military operations” in the case 
of an occupation. Id. Additionally, “protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment 
may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention.” Id.  
 22. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/, (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter “Protocol I”]. This Protocol builds upon Common Article II of the 
Geneva Conventions and applies in times of international armed conflict. Protocol I states that “[t]he 
physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power of the adverse Party or who are 
interned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of a situation referred to in Article 1 shall 
not be endangered by an unjustified act or omission.” Id. art. 11(1). Protocol II Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international 
Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978), available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 
“Protocol II”]. This Protocol builds upon Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions and applies 
in times of non-international armed conflict. In fact, Protocol II applies to “all persons affected by an 
armed conflict,” not just members of the armed forces. Id. art. 2(1). While Protocols I and II are 
approaching the status of customary international law, the United States is not a Party to the Protocols 
and, therefore, for the purposes of this Note, their applicability will not be discussed. It should, 
however, be observed that, if their status as customary international law is solidified, the United States 
would be bound to the Protocols and this discussion would need to be expanded. 
 23. The applicability of principles of international human rights law is evidenced by the Martens 
Clause of Hague Convention IV, which states that “in cases not included in the Regulations . . . the 
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of 
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and the dictates of the public conscience.” Hague Convention IV, supra note 13, pmbl., para. 8. The 
Martens Clause indicates that the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law do not cease to apply merely because codified international 
humanitarian law does not cover a specific situation. 
 Furthermore, a modern interpretation of the Martens Clause was included in Protocol I, which 
stated that “[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” 
Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 1, para. 2. 
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implementing the Convention Against Torture.24 This Convention, to 
which the United States is party, addresses the actions and obligations of 
States and condemns the use of torture under any and all circumstances.25 
In addition to providing for territorial and personal jurisdiction, the 
Convention Against Torture also mandates jurisdiction whenever the 
accused is within a State’s territory.26 Other important aspects of the 
Convention include: a State Party may not extradite a person when there 
are grounds to believe that person may be subjected to torture,27 the 
Convention serves as an extradition treaty,28 there is no defense of superior 
orders,29 due process considerations are evidenced,30 evidence obtained 
through torture is inadmissible,31 and there is an obligation to raise 
awareness of the prohibition of torture.32 In addition to this prohibition, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,33 the International Covenant on 
 24. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (entered into force June 26, 1987), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/NR0/760/92/img/NR076092.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter “Convention Against 
Torture”].  
 25. The primary responsibility of State Parties is to “take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” Convention 
Against Torture, supra note 24, art. 2(1). Furthermore, “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Id. art. 2(2). Additionally, State Parties must “prevent . . . 
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture . . . 
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. art. 16(1). In a European Court of 
Human Rights case, the court espoused its awareness “of the immense difficulties faced by States in 
modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence” but cautioned that “however, 
even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct.” Chahal v. United Kingdom, 
22 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 1996–V 1855, para. 79 (1996). Furthermore, the Committee Against Torture 
“acknowledges the terrible dilemma that Israel confronts in dealing with terrorist threats to its security, 
but as a State party to the Convention Israel is precluded from raising before this Committee 
exceptional circumstances as justification for acts prohibited by article 1 of the Convention.” Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee Against Torture: Israel 09/05/97, U.N. Doc. No. A/52/44, para. 258, available at 
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/N97/235/57/img/N9723557.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2005). 
 26. A State Party is required “to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction. . . .” Convention Against Torture, 
supra note 24, art. 5(2). 
 27. Id. art. 3. 
 28. Id. art. 8(2). 
 29. Id. art. 2(3). 
 30. Id. arts. 6, 7, 13, 14. 
 31. Id. art. 15. 
 32. Id. art. 10(1). 
 33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948), art. 5, available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR00/752/35/img/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/7
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Civil and Political Rights,34 the Declaration on the Protection of all 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances,35 and various regional 
agreements36 also hold that no one shall be subjected to torture. 
Furthermore, customary international law prohibits torture and has 
expanded the application of the prohibition to include individual as well as 
state responsibility.37 The Supreme Court has held that customary 
international law is part of U.S. law.38 
NR075235.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter “UDHR”] (No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).  
 34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 7 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/732/59/img/NR073259. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter “ICCPR”] (stating that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). Furthermore, article 4 of the 
ICCPR bars derogation from the prohibition on torture expressed in article 7 of the ICCPR even “in 
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed.” ICCPR, art. 4. 
 35. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 
47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992), adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 47/133 of Dec. 18, 1992, art. 1(2), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/NR0/751/35/img/NR0735135.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter “DPAPED”] 
(recognizing “the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment”). 
 36. See also regional agreements such as [European] Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948, OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 
Rev. (1965); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
 37. While individual responsibility for violations of the law of war and crimes against humanity 
will be discussed further in Part V of this Note, for now, it is sufficient to note that the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court allows for individual criminal responsibility, removes head-of-state 
immunity, incorporates responsibility of commanders and other superiors, and provides for a joint 
criminal enterprise theory of liability. Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, adopted by 
the U.N. Diplomatic Conference, opened for signature July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, arts. 
25, 27, 28 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter “Rome Statute”], reprinted in LEILA SADAT, 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM app. 1 (2002). This codification is considered “the culmination of 
almost fifty years of debate, discussion and judicial decisions concerning the principle of command 
responsibility.” Matthew Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 139 (2000). Article 10 of the Rome Statute states that “[n]othing in this Part shall be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules in international law for 
purposes other than this statute.” Rome Statute, art. 10. In essence, while the Rome Statute has 
codified existing international law, it is recognizing the fact that customary law may continue to 
develop in a manner inconsistent with the statute. 
 38. The Supreme Court held that 
[i]nternational law is part of [American] law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as question of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs 
and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
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C. U.S. Constitutional Law 
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to understand the 
confluence of international and national law.39 Article VI of the U.S. 
Constitution states that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land. . . .”40 The Supreme Court has held that treaties 
entered into by the U.S. Government hold the same weight as federal 
legislation as long as they are not repugnant to the Constitution.41 The 
President, in the discharge of his duties, must uphold the Constitution and 
treaties entered into by the United States;42 to do otherwise would be a 
commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves 
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects. . . . 
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
728–31 (2004) (affirming that international law is part of U.S. law). 
 39. This Note will not discuss the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. Constitutional rights, 
rather it will focus upon the inclusion and subsequent enforceability of international law as a part of 
U.S. law. For a discussion of the extraterritorial applicability of the U.S. Constitution, see Leah E. 
Kraft, The Judiciary’s Opportunity to Protect International Human Rights: Applying the U.S. 
Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1073 (2004). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 41. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (holding that “treaties made under the 
authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in 
pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land”). Furthermore, “[b]y the Constitution, 
laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the United States are both 
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one over the other.” 
Ping v. U.S, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). In 1829, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “our constitution 
declares a treaty to be the law of the land, which is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature.” Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The 
Supreme Court has held that “when the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and 
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Furthermore 
[i]n choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and 
restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed 
controlling in the interpretation of international agreements. Considerations which should 
govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, 
require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent 
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. For that reason if a 
treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed 
under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred. 
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293–94 (1933). See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888). “[A] treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of 
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of land, and no superior 
efficacy is given to either over the other.” Id. 
 42. The U.S. Constitution states that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. While this clause of the Constitution seems clear, there is 
some debate concerning the President’s ability to disregard the law of the land. See Jordan Paust, Is the 
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dereliction of his duties.43 Thus, interrogation methods need not only be in 
accordance with the Constitution and acts of Congress, but also with 
treaties entered into by the federal government.  
The U.S. Constitution does not prohibit torture explicitly, but there is a 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment,”44 guarantees of justice and 
general welfare,45 freedom from unreasonable search and seizure,46 
freedom from police abuse,47 the right against self incrimination,48 the 
right to remain silent,49 and the right to due process.50 The Supreme Court 
has held that due process considerations, including freedom from torture 
and illegal confinement, must be upheld.51 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has held that, “when the President takes official action, the Court 
has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.”52 As 
the Convention Against Torture has not been challenged on grounds of 
repugnancy, and because it evidences the basic principles of humanity 
inherent in the U.S. Constitution,53 it can be assumed that the Convention 
President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?—Foreign Affairs and National Security 
Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 727 (1982) (stating that “the President of the United 
States is . . . bound by international law which is part of the supreme law of the land under article VI). 
See also id. at 728 n.24 (stating that “[i]n The Paquette Habana . . . the Supreme Court actually voided 
an executive action involving use of our armed forces in time of war precisely because it was violative 
of international law”); Richard Faulk, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A 
Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1096, 1150 (1967) (stating that “adherence to 
international law [is] a matter of Constitutional necessity . . . this is the way the Constitution ought to 
be authoritatively construed”). See generally Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United 
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 930 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary 
International Law by the Chief Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321 (1985); John 
Yoo, AEI Conference Trends In Global Governance: Do They Threaten American Sovereignty? 
Article and Response: UN Wars, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355 (2000). 
 43. For a discussion of the President’s responsibilities, see Matthew Campbell, Bombs Over 
Baghdad: Making the Case for War Crimes Prosecution of a U.S. President, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 235 (2005).  
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 45. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 47. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV for this implicit guarantee. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 51. The Supreme Court held that 
[f]rom the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and extortion of 
confessions of violations of the “law of the land” evolved the fundamental idea that no man’s 
life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of that law until there 
had been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, 
excitement, and tyrannical power.  
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1940). 
 52. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997).  
 53. “[T]he moral reading [of the Constitution] is not revolutionary in practice. Lawyers and 
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is not repugnant to the Constitution. Keeping in mind the role of 
international treaties and the provisions of the Constitution, it is now 
necessary to examine specific acts of Congress. 
D. Domestic War Crimes Legislation 
In 1994, the Torture Convention Implementation Act54 was 
promulgated in order to bring U.S. law into accordance with the 
Convention Against Torture,55 and to provide universal jurisdiction for 
U.S. federal courts over acts of torture that occur outside of U.S. 
territory.56 Furthermore, the War Crimes Act57 provides universal 
judges, in their day-to-day work, instinctively treat the Constitution as expressing abstract moral 
requirements that can only be applied to concrete cases through fresh moral judgments.” RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2003) (1996). Moreover, 
the principles set out in the Bill of Rights, taken together, commit the United States to the 
following political and legal ideals: government must treat all those subject to its dominion as 
having equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with 
equal concern; and it must respect whatever individual freedoms are indispensable to those 
ends, including but not limited to the freedoms more specifically designated in the 
document. . . . 
Id. at 7–8. “[T]he Bill of Rights sets out a network of principles, some extremely concrete, others more 
abstract, and some of near limitless abstraction.” Id. at 73. Therefore, “the Constitution must be 
understood not as a list of discrete rules but as a charter of principle that must be interpreted and 
enforced as a coherent system.” Id. at 124. 
 54. Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–236, 108 Stat. 463 (1994) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (2005)) [hereinafter “Torture Convention Implementation Act”]. 
 55. See supra note 24. 
 56. The Torture Convention Implementation Act states that “[w]hoever outside the United States 
commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both, and if death results . . . shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for 
life.” Torture Convention Implementation Act, § 2340A(a). Federal courts have jurisdiction if “the 
alleged offender is a national of the United States; or the alleged offender is present in the United 
States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.” Torture Convention 
Implementation Act, § 2340A(b). 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340 defines torture for purposes of the Torture 
Convention Implementation Act; this definition is slightly different from the definition in the Torture 
Convention. However, this distinction will not be discussed in this Note, as it is assumed that detainee 
interrogation methods rise to the level of torture regardless of which definition is utilized. See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing assumption of torture). Furthermore, the Act provides for 
the prosecution of those who conspire to commit torture. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A(c) (stating that “[a] 
person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties 
(other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which 
was the object of the conspiracy”). The USA Patriot Act amended the Torture Convention 
Implementation Act to bring Guantanamo within the boundaries of the United States; as such, U.S. 
courts would not have jurisdiction over events at Guantanamo under the Torture Convention 
Implementation Act. PENTAGON WORKING GROUP, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE 
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, 
POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 7–8 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/nation/documents/040403.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) [hereinafter “RUMSFELD TORTURE 
MEMO”]. Other statutes, however, would apply to Guantanamo. See infra notes 57, 58. 
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jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts over members of the U.S. armed forces 
or nationals of the United States who commit war crimes or are the victims 
of war crimes, wherever the acts take place.58 Additionally, the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act59 provides for the prosecution of crimes 
committed by U.S. armed forces outside the United States.60  
While not an act specifically addressing war crimes, it is also important 
to note 18 U.S.C. § 242, which provides for the prosecution of any person 
acting under the color of law who deprives any person in any territory or 
possession of the United States of any rights accorded by the Constitution 
and laws (including treaties) of the United States.61 Finally, the U.S. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits cruelty, maltreatment, and 
maiming.62 The result of the above-mentioned acts is to provide U.S. 
 57. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–192, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (codified at 18 
U.S.C.S. § 2441 (1996)) [hereinafter “War Crimes Act”]. 
 58. The War Crimes Act holds that “[w]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, 
commits a war crime . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life of any term of years, or 
both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.” War Crimes Act, 
supra note 57, § 2441(a). The federal courts will have jurisdiction so long as “the person committing 
such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
or a national of the United States. . . .” Id. § 2441(b). War crimes are defined for the purposes of this 
statute as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; violations of Hague Convention IV; violations of 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols to the Geneva Conventions that the United 
States is a party to; and violations of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices. War Crimes Act, supra note 57, § 2441(c). 
 59. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–523, § 2(a), 114 Stat. 2488 
(2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000)) [hereinafter “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act”]. 
 60. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act covers actions “that would constitute an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 
supra note 59, § 3261(a). 
 61. 18 U.S.C.S. § 242 states 
whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects 
any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person 
being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of 
citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if 
bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts 
include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death 
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping 
or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual 
abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years 
or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. 
Id. This statute is applicable to occurrences at Guantanamo. See infra note 83. 
 62. 10 U.S.C. § 893, art. 93 (1956) (“[a]ny person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty 
toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct”); 10 U.S.C. § 924, art. 124 (1956) (creating liability for the act of maiming).  
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federal courts with jurisdiction over incidents of torture committed by U.S. 
military and civilian personnel wherever the act occurred.63 Furthermore, 
military courts hold concurrent jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel 
who commit actions of cruelty and mistreat prisoners under their control 
regardless of whether the actions arise to the level of torture.64 This Note 
will not discuss the Alien Tort Clams Act,65 the Torture Victim Protection 
Act,66 or 18 U.S.C. § 1983,67 as these are foundations for civil actions as 
opposed to criminal actions, and thus are beyond the scope of this Note. 
II. OCCURRENCES IN GUANTANAMO, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 
It must be understood that the events in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq cannot be looked at in isolation, and that, together, they point to an 
encompassing U.S. governmental policy of approved torture techniques in 
detainee interrogations.68 Once an understanding of the overarching U.S. 
 63. This jurisdiction is in accordance with both international law and the provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 64. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802, 893, and 924 (1956). 
 65. Alien Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 934 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)) (stating that 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
 66. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)) (allowing aliens who have been tortured by officials of a foreign 
nation to claim civil damages).  
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) states 
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law.  
Id. 
 68. For a more detailed analysis of the events that occurred, see ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra 
note 5; ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5; ICRC REPORT, supra note 5; U.S. ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (Mar. 9, 2004), http://www.npr.org/iraq/ 
2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter “TAGUBA REPORT”]; CT.-GEN. 
ANTHONY R. JONES, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, in INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB, 
6; MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION 
FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, in INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 34 (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.c-span.org/pdf/armyabughraib.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2005); DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL, DETAINEE OPERATIONS 
INSPECTION (July 21, 2004), http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/ (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2005); and FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION 
OPERATIONS (Aug. 2004), http://news. findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 
24, 2005) [hereinafter “SCHLESINGER REPORT”]. A complete analysis of the establishment and 
operation of the detention facilities is beyond the scope of this Note—a recent judgment of the ICTY 
in a case involving the establishment and operation of detention facilities was 241 pages long and 
included eighty-five paragraphs concerning the establishment and operation of the detention facilities. 
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policy is laid out, there will be a short examination of the events that 
occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq.69 While there have been four areas of 
potential U.S. violations of international law with respect to detention 
operations and interrogations, for purposes of this Note, the focus will be 
upon the treatment of detainees.70  
Guantanamo is important not just because it has become a detention 
center for Afghan detainees, but also because the interrogation techniques 
utilized in Afghanistan and Iraq were developed by the U.S. government 
for use in Guantanamo.71 The U.S. policy evinces a willingness to hold 
international humanitarian and human rights law inapplicable to members 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban in clear violation of the international laws 
discussed in Part II.72 Furthermore, those involved in developing this 
policy ignored the principles behind the Constitution and determined 
domestic law provided no protections to al Qaeda and Taliban members 
from the actions of U.S. military and intelligence personnel.73 This policy 
was developed at the highest levels of the U.S. government with 
coordination between the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, 
and the White House before being communicated to military commanders 
See generally Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, paras. 23–108 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/ judgment/ kvo-tj011002e.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) 
[hereinafter “Kvocka”]. 
 69. See infra notes 71–91 and accompanying text (detailing the events). 
 70. Three areas identified are: “use of excessive force by U.S. forces during arrests; arbitrary 
arrests and indefinite detention; and mistreatment in detention.” ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 
10. The fourth area is the U.S. practice of transferring detainees to the control of a third party state that 
utilizes torture during the interrogation of detainees (with or without U.S. involvement in the 
interrogation). See ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5, at 10–12. This practice is in clear violation of 
the prohibition on such transfers by the Convention Against Torture. Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How 
do U.S. Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at B1. 
 71. For a discussion of the U.S. government’s position regarding the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions and U.S. detainee interrogation techniques, see generally Department of Justice, Memo to 
White House and Pentagon Counsels Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), http://www.qwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ 02.01.09.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2005); Presidential Memorandum to National Security Team of February 7, 2002, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiV/NSEBB/NSEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005); 
Department of Justice, Memo to the White House Counsel Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/ 
bybee80102mem.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005); Department of Defense, Memo Re: Counter-
Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ 
dodmemos.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005); RUMSFELD TORTURE MEMO, supra note 56; Donald 
Rumsfeld, Memo to Commander of U.S. Southern Command Re: Guantanamo Interrogation 
Techniques (Apr. 16, 2003), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB127/ 03.04.16.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2005). 
 72. See supra note 71. 
 73. Id. 
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in the field.74 In short, the policy was grounded in the belief “that the new 
war against terrorism rendered ‘obsolete’ long-standing legal restrictions 
on the treatment and interrogation of detainees.”75  
The Afghanistan conflict began as an international armed conflict, but 
has since converted to an internal armed conflict with U.S. forces 
operating in Afghanistan under the auspices of the Afghan government; 
however, this nuance does not change the fact that torture is prohibited.76 
Numerous Afghan detainees were transferred from Afghanistan to the U.S. 
military base in Guantanamo, Cuba.77 Interrogators in Afghanistan, and 
Guantanamo to an undisclosed extent,78 utilized the newly-approved 
interrogation techniques that amounted to torture and violated numerous 
international and domestic prohibitions on torture.79 It is apparent that 
Afghan civilians, members of the Taliban armed forces and al Qaeda 
operatives were subjected to torture during their detention by U.S. and 
Afghani forces.80 Considering Human Rights Watch filed reports detailing 
the abuse,81 and numerous news articles alleging mistreatment were 
published in early 2002,82 the mistreatment of prisoners was certainly 
known to high level military and civilian leaders. Therefore, illegal 
interrogation techniques not only were used in a territory under U.S. 
 74. Id. 
 75. ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5, at 1. The U.S. justifications for the inapplicability of 
the Geneva Conventions and other international and domestic law will be discussed in Part IV. 
 76. See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment 
of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, Germany, Dec. 5, 2001, http://www.ifes.org/searchable/ 
ifes_site/PDF/reg_activities/Afghan_BonnAgreement.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 
“Bonn Agreement”]. This conversion will affect the applicable law, but the principles remain the 
same. Whether termed an international armed conflict or an internal armed conflict, international 
human rights and humanitarian law still apply; only the precedential effect changes. Under an 
international armed conflict, international human rights law takes precedence, whereas international 
humanitarian law takes precedence during an internal armed conflict. See ENDURING FREEDOM, supra 
note 5, at 47–48. 
 77. See Inside Guantanamo (BBC-One radio broadcast Oct. 5, 2003), http://fairgofordavid.org/ 
pwodocs/bbctranscript.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005). 
 78. “The United States has carefully controlled information about detainees at Guantanamo, 
barring them from most contact with the outside world. As a result, little is publicly known [those] . . . 
held at Guantanamo.” ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5, at 13. 
 79. See generally ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5 and ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5. 
 80. See ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5. 
 81. In 2003, Human Rights Watch sent requests to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, General 
John Abizaid (commander of Central Command) and George Tenet (then-Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency) seeking to hold meetings to discuss reports of abuse suffered by detainees in 
Afghanistan. ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 3 n.3. 
 82. See generally Carlotta Gall, Released Afghans Tell of Beatings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, 
at A1; Molly Moore, Villagers Released by American Troops Say They Were Beaten, Kept in ‘Cage,’ 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at A1; Eric Slater, U.S. Forces Beat Afghans After Deadly Assault, Ex-
Prisoners Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at A1. 
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jurisdiction,83 but also during the occupation of a sovereign state.84 
Because international law protects all those detained in Afghanistan (and 
Guantanamo)—whether civilian, Taliban, or al Qaeda—from torture in 
both an international armed conflict and a non-international armed 
conflict,85 it is clear that serious violations of that law occurred in 
Afghanistan. 
In Iraq, the situation is different because the detainees in Iraq are either 
prisoners-of-war or civilians and the protections of international law were 
to be applied from the outset.86 However, military personnel from 
Guantanamo and Afghanistan were sent to Iraq to train others in 
interrogation methods and to conduct interrogations.87 The utilization of 
torture during detainee interrogations thus migrated from the detention 
centers in Guantanamo and Afghanistan to a new conflict, the occupation 
of Iraq,88 and enabled the military personnel in Iraq to feel “empowered to 
 83. The 1934 Treaty between the United States and Cuba gave the United States jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo. Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 
1683. The Supreme Court has upheld this interpretation of the treaty, stating that “[b]y the express 
terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so 
chooses.” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004). 
 84. See generally ENDURING FREEDOM, supra note 5. 
 85. All three categories of persons are protected under the Convention Against Torture during 
either international or non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, all are protected by Common 
Article III of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II (if accepted as customary international law) 
during non-international armed conflict. During international armed conflicts Geneva Convention III 
protects the Taliban prisoners of war and Geneva Convention IV protects civilians. The status of al 
Qaeda operatives is less certain, however, as they seem to fall in a grey area between that of civilians 
and prisoners of war. Regardless, they must still be afforded the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions until such time as a competent tribunal determines their status. Furthermore, al Qaeda 
members fall into two categories: those bearing arms and those who support the organization. Those 
that bore arms would be afforded prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions and those that 
merely supported the organization would have to be protected as civilians. Additionally, the Geneva 
Conventions do not make an exception for “enemy combatants,” as the United States is attempting to 
label al Qaeda members. The Geneva Conventions protect all persons; there is only a question of 
which Convention applies. 
 86. There has been no attempt by the U.S. government to declare the protections of international 
law inapplicable to the detainees in Iraq. In fact, the Schlesinger Report found that “[p]olicies 
approved for use on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, who were not afforded the protection of the 
Geneva Conventions, now applied to detainees who did fall under the Geneva Convention 
protections.” SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 68, at 14. 
 87. Douglas Jehl & Andrea Elliot, Cuba Base Sent Its Interrogators to Iraqi Prison, May 28, 
2004, N.Y. TIMES, at A5; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Afghan Policies on Questioning Landed in 
Iraq, May 21, 2004, N.Y. TIMES, at A1; ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5, at 23 (stating that “[t]he 
military intelligence unit that oversaw interrogations at the Bagram detention center . . . was later 
placed in charge of questioning at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq”). 
 88. See generally SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 68 (detailing the abusive techniques used in 
Iraq and their migration from Afghanistan). 
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abuse the detainee.”89 The migration of these techniques and the 
condoning of these techniques by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
led U.S. military personnel to believe that “if you don’t violate someone’s 
human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job.”90 
Furthermore, there is evidence that those responsible for implementing 
and running the detention facilities in Iraq failed to operate the facilities in 
a manner that would facilitate the humane treatment of prisoners.91 While 
the U.S. policy may not have been developed with an eye to Iraq, by 
circumventing international law and utilizing torture in one war, it was 
conceivable that the dehumanization of detainees, the changing of decades 
of military policy, and poorly implemented detention methods would lead 
to a continuing usage of torture. 
 89. ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra note 5, at 34. 
 90. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; “Stress and 
Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 
26, 2002, at A1 (quoting an unnamed U.S. official). 
 91. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 68, at 16–17; SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 68. “[I]n 
Iraq and particularly in Abu Ghraib the ratio of military police to repeatedly unruly detainees was . . . 
at one point 1 to about 75 at Abu Ghraib, making it difficult to even keep track of prisoners.” 
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 68, at 10. “Of the 17 detention facilities in Iraq, the largest, Abu 
Ghraib, housed up to 7,000 detainees in October 2003, with a guard force of only about 90 personnel 
from the 800th Military Police Brigade. Abu Ghraib was seriously overcrowded, under-resourced, and 
under continual attack.” Id. at 11. Furthermore, “unit cohesion was lacking because elements of as 
many as six different units were assigned to the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib.” Id. at 12. “The 
existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that 
additional interrogation techniques [such as those utilized at Guantanamo] were condoned.” Id. at 10. 
The Schlesinger Report determined that “[t]he aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell Block 1 at 
Abu Ghraib would have been avoided with proper training, leadership and oversight.” Id. at 13. 
Currently, “[i]ncreased units of Military Police, fully manned and more appropriately equipped, are 
performing the mission once assigned to a single under-strength, poorly trained, inadequately equipped 
and weakly-led brigade.” Id. at 16.  
The requirements for successful detainee operations following major combat operations were 
known to U.S. forces in Iraq. After Operations Enduring Freedom and earlier phases of Iraqi 
Freedom, several lessons learned were captured in official reviews and were available on-line 
to any authorized military user. These lessons included the need for doctrine tailored to 
enable police and interrogators to work together effectively; the need for keeping MP and MI 
units manned at levels sufficient to the task; and the need for MP and MI units to belong to 
the same tactical command. However, there is no evidence that those responsible for planning 
and executing detainee operations, in the phase of the Iraq campaign following the major 
combat operations, availed themselves of these “lessons learned” in a timely fashion. 
Id. at 30. In addition, “Abu Ghraib was also a questionable facility from a standpoint of conducting 
interrogations. Its location, next to an urban area, and its large size in relation to the small MP unit 
tasked to provide law enforcement presence, made it impossible to achieve the necessary degree of 
security.” Id. at 60. Furthermore, “[t]he choice of Abu Ghraib as the facility for detention operations 
placed a strictly detention mission-driven unit—one designed to operate in a rear area—smack in the 
middle of a combat environment.” Id.  
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III. U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS 
Both international and domestic law prohibit the use of torture, 
regardless of the need to extract information.92 However, the Department 
of Defense, at the Secretary of Defense’s request, has recently attempted 
to legitimize the application of torture to unlawful or enemy combatants in 
Guantanamo and Afghanistan.93 The Department of Defense and the 
Department of Justice have determined that the Geneva Conventions do 
not apply to either al Qaeda, because they are not a contracting party to the 
Conventions, or the Taliban, as they are considered unlawful combatants.94 
Furthermore, the Rumsfeld Torture Memo concluded that the Convention 
Against Torture and the ICCPR would apply, but only within the bounds 
of the U.S. Constitution which, it argues, does not restrict U.S. detainee 
interrogation methods.95 Additionally, the Department of Defense 
determined that customary international law was not federal law and 
therefore not applicable, as an executive order overrides any obligations 
under customary international law.96 The Department of Defense also 
determined that the powers vested in the President enable him to conduct a 
war and that any domestic statutes that might interfere with his 
constitutional authority to conduct a war must be construed in a manner 
consistent with that constitutional authority. Therefore, any executive 
order allowing torture must be upheld as a part of the President’s mandate 
to conduct war.97 Furthermore, the working group that prepared the 
Rumsfeld Torture Memo maintains that aliens do not gain constitutional 
protections, though the United States also maintains that torture must be 
construed in light of the restrictions of the Constitution.98  
None of the justifications legitimize torture.99 First, the Geneva 
Conventions are an accepted part of customary international law, and, as 
 92. See supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 93. See generally RUMSFELD TORTURE MEMO, supra note 56 (the United States has not 
attempted to legitimize the use in Iraq). Counsel to the President has stated, “Iraq presents a very 
different situation and the United States recognizes that [the Geneva Conventions] are binding in the 
war for the liberation of Iraq”, however, “[t]here has never been any suggestion by our government 
that the conventions do not apply in that conflict.” Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial, The Rule of Law 
and the Rules of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2004, at A17. 
 94. RUMSFELD TORTURE MEMO, supra note 56, at 4. 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 20–24. 
 98. Id. at 35. For a discussion of the applicability of the U.S. Constitution to aliens, see Kraft, 
supra note 39. 
 99. Various arguments have been put forth for the moral justification of the application of torture 
during the War on Terror. However, as these arguments do not address the illegality of torture and 
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such, all parties to armed conflict are bound by the Conventions, 
regardless of their status as contracting parties.100 Second, the Conventions 
do not make an exception for militants not recognized by an opposing 
party; therefore, the Taliban are covered regardless of their definition or 
lack of recognition by the United States.101 Third, customary international 
law, which prohibits torture, has been incorporated into federal law and 
has been used in the interpretation of domestic laws and international 
obligations governing the United States.102 The most relevant international 
laws are the international humanitarian law and human rights law that bind 
the United States.103  
While the justification that statutes must be interpreted as being in 
accordance with the Constitution when there is the possibility of either a 
constitutional or an unconstitutional interpretation is technically correct, 
that canon is being incorrectly applied.104 A statute should be interpreted 
in accordance with the Constitution, not in accordance with the 
presidential authority accorded by the Constitution.105 The rights of 
humanity inherent in the Constitution, which provide a basis for the rights 
contained within the Constitution,106 are intrinsic to all and should not be 
have been refuted by preeminent academics and practitioners, this Note will not address the issue of 
moral justification. For a discussion of whether torture may be justified, see generally Alan M. 
Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 
(2003/2004); Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 58 (2002); Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement 
Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307 (2003); Jonathan F. Lenzner, From a Pakistani 
Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession’s Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led War on 
Terror, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 297 (2004). 
 100. “The Geneva Conventions which have now been widely recognized as part of customary 
international law are binding upon all States. . . .” Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The Applicability 
of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping: Conceptual, Legal and 
Practical Issues, in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS SYMPOSIUM ON HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 47 (Umesh Palwankar ed., 1994). Therefore, not only is 
the United States bound by the Geneva Conventions, so are the opposing militants in Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 101. See supra note 16. In essence, the Geneva Conventions apply a blanket protection for all 
people of the world. All parties to an armed conflict are bound by the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and are required to protect all those taking part in, or affected by, an armed conflict. 
Because there is no need for recognition, the Geneva Conventions essentially prohibit the torture of 
anyone by a party to an armed conflict. 
 102. “The current accepted position is that customary international law in the United States is 
federal law and that its determination by the federal courts is binding on the state courts.” MALCOLM 
N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (Cambridge Univ. Press 5th ed. 2003). 
 103. See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 104. See supra Part I.C. 
 105. See supra Part I.C. 
 106. See supra note 53. 
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abrogated by an executive order.107 Courts have been unwilling to inspect 
the President’s use of the executive war powers; however, the Supreme 
Court does have this right and an order as blatantly illegal as one ordering 
the use of torture in detainee interrogations should be struck down.108 The 
President has the mandate to conduct war,109 but the President also has a 
duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the land.110 By mandating 
the use of torture, the President is in dereliction of his duty.111 
Furthermore, there is an inherent contradiction in the U.S. policy that 
Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens but interrogations of aliens 
must be conducted in accordance with the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.112 Either constitutional rights apply or they do not—if the 
Constitution is not applicable to aliens, then the Constitution should not be 
used to restrict the application of international human rights law to 
aliens.113 Justifications for the application of torture fail at all levels: on 
grounds of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, 
 107. For debate concerning the powers inherent to Executive Orders, see Tara L. Branum, 
President or King: The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1 
(2002). 
 108. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
 109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. 
 111. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 112. For a discussion of the applicability of the U.S. Constitution to aliens, see Kraft, supra note 
39. 
 113. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated  
[t]he government, however, while not denying that American citizens may invoke the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by our government 
beyond the continental limits of the United States, contends that such rights are not available 
to aliens who are the victims of such conduct. We disagree. Like the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee of due process, the Fourth Amendment refers to and protects “people” rather than 
“areas,” or “citizens.” “The Constitution of the United States is in force . . . whenever and 
wherever the sovereign power of that government is exerted.” 
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted) (quoting Balzac v. 
Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922)). While a full discussion of the extraterritorial applicability 
of the Constitution is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be observed that this is a highly-debated 
topic. Despite this debate, the inconsistency put forth by the U.S. government cannot be reconciled. 
The Constitution is either applicable or not applicable; the government may not determine the 
Constitution’s applicability based on its desired action or result. Otherwise, the government is 
engaging in nothing but utilitarian and self-interested line-drawing. For a discussion of the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution to aliens, see Roberto Iraola, A Primer on Legal Issues 
Surrounding the Extraterritorial Apprehension of Criminals, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2001); Kraft, supra 
note 39; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International 
Law, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 176 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 722 cmt. m (1987) 
(“at least some actions by the United States in respect of foreign nationals are also subject to 
constitutional limitations”). 
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U.S. Constitutional law and U.S. domestic law.114 Because torture is illegal 
and unjustifiable, a discussion of applicable theories of liability under 
international law is now necessary to show that high level officials that 
ordered the torture can and should be held responsible.115  
IV. APPLICABLE THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Because there is no justification for torture, it is necessary to determine 
who should be held responsible.116 This Note suggests that individuals 
other than those “aberrant individuals”117 who used torture in the detainee 
interrogations that occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq can be found liable 
for failing to fulfill their duties as commanders under the doctrine of 
command responsibility or for taking part in a joint criminal enterprise.118 
A. Command Responsibility 
The doctrine of command responsibility began its development in 
modern international law in the 1907 Hague Convention IV,119 the 
Versailles Treaty,120 and the 1929 Red Cross Convention.121 These three 
instruments recognized the importance of command responsibility and 
expressed the willingness of the international community to hold high-
level violators of the laws and customs of war criminally liable.122 
 114. See supra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 115. See supra Part I. 
 116. The Schlesinger Report found that “commanding officers and their staffs at various levels 
failed in their duties and that such failures contributed directly or indirectly to detainee abuse” and that 
“military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility.” 
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 68, at 43. Furthermore, the manner in which Abu Ghraib was 
operated “had the damaging result that no single individual was responsible for overseeing operations 
at the prison.” Id. at 45. Responsibility includes “the Director for Operations, Combined Joint Task 
Force 7 (CJTF-7); Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7; Commander CJTF-7; Deputy Commander 
for Support, CFLCC; Commander, CFLCC; Director for Operations, Central Command (CENTCOM); 
Commander, CENTCOMM; Director for Operations, Joint Staff; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.” Id. at 47. 
 117. See supra note 9. 
 118. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B. 
 119. Hague Convention IV, supra note 13. 
 120. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (June 28, 1919) 
[hereinafter “Versailles Treaty”], reprinted in THE TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923, VOL. I (Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace 1924). 
 121. Red Cross Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
Armies in the Field, 47 Stat. 2074 [hereinafter “1929 Red Cross Convention”]. 
 122. Hague Convention IV states that the laws of war apply to armies, militia and volunteer corps 
“commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,” and that this person, when occupying 
territory “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Hague 
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Following World War II, the Allied powers promulgated laws governing 
the trial of war criminals.123 The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg addressed command responsibility by stating that 
“[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any 
of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any 
person in execution of such plan.”124 The principle of command 
responsibility was adopted into customary international law with the 
subsequent affirmation by the United Nations General Assembly.125  
Following the trials of World War II, little occurred with the doctrine 
of command responsibility in international courts until the ad hoc tribunals 
created by the United Nations for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.126 
Convention IV, supra note 13, Annex to the Convention, arts. 1, 43. The Versailles Treaty demanded 
the trial of Kaiser [William II of Hohenzollern] by international tribunal and persons accused of 
violating the laws of war by international military tribunals. Lippman, supra note 37, at 140. 
Furthermore, commanders have “the duty . . . to provide for the details of the foregoing articles [of the 
convention].” 1929 Red Cross Convention, supra note 121, art. 26. 
 123. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Annex to the London 
Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter “IMT-N Charter”]; Tokyo Charter for the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as amended by General Orders No. 20, Apr. 26, 1946, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter “IMT-FE Charter”]; Allied Control Council Law no. 10, Punishment of 
Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945 [hereinafter 
“Allied Control Council Law No. 10”]; United States Armed Forces, Pacific, Regulations Governing 
the Trial of War Criminals, Sept. 24, 1945, National Archives, Records of SCAP Legal Division 
Record Group 331, Stack 290, Row 9, Compartment 31, Shelf 1+, Box 1855, File 124, cited in Evan J. 
Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama: Does the Sauce Suit the Gander?, ARMY LAW., Nov. 
2003, at 35 n.154. 
 124. IMT-N Charter, supra note 123, art. 6. For World War II case law concerning command 
responsibility, see United States v. Yamashita, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL. 
IV, TRIAL OF GENERAL TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA (United Nations War Commission 1948); United 
States v. List, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL. VIII, THE HOSTAGES TRIAL: 
TRIAL OF WILHELM LIST AND OTHERS (United Nations War Commission 1949); United States v. von 
Leeb, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL. XII, THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND 
TRIAL: TRIAL OF WILHELM VON LEEB AND THIRTEEN OTHERS (United Nations War Commission 
1949).  
 125. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, at 188, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc A/64/Add.1 (1946), reprinted in THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 833 (Sigthoff & Noordhoff 2d ed. 1981). 
 126. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter “ICTY Statute”]; 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter “ICTR Statute”]. While little 
occurred between World War II and the creation of the ad hoc tribunals, command responsibility was 
dealt with in national courts. See generally Lieutenant Commander Weston D. Burnett, Contemporary 
International Legal Issues-Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility 
of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatilia and Sabra, 107 MIL. L. REV. 71 (1985); 
Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Smidt, 
supra note 4. Furthermore, international agreements have affirmed the application of the doctrine. See 
Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 86, 87. 
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The doctrine has received extensive treatment in the ad hoc tribunals and 
the modern interpretation of the doctrine allows for the prosecution of 
military commanders and civilians for the actions of those subordinates 
over whom they held effective control, when they knew or had reason to 
know that such subordinates had committed or were planning to commit 
violations of the law of war and they failed to prevent or punish such 
violations.127 In addition, the doctrine’s incorporation into the Rome 
Statute serves as an indication that the doctrine is now a part of customary 
international law.128 Moreover, the doctrine of command responsibility is 
an accepted part of U.S. law, as it has been incorporated into the U.S. 
Army Field Manual.129 Accordingly, the U.S. government has been willing 
to seek prosecutions based on the doctrine.130 
While this doctrine, on its face, appears to be the best method of 
holding individuals other than the “bad apples” responsible for the torture 
that occurred in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, there are difficulties 
in applying the doctrine. There is a high threshold of knowledge that 
requires a showing that the commander possessed of information that 
would either cause him to know that violations of international law were 
occurring or had occurred, or that would cause the commander to realize 
that further investigation was required.131 Establishing who was aware of 
what and when they were aware could be a very complicated task when 
attempting to follow the information trail through the military and 
government agencies. Furthermore, there is an issue of effective control. 
 127. For a more in-depth treatment of this doctrine, see Damien S. Donnelly-Cole, Application of 
the Doctrine of Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Delalic (Dec. 17, 2004) (unpublished seminar paper, Wash. Univ. School of 
Law) (on file with the author). For case law arising from the ad hoc tribunals, see Prosecutor v. 
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-
e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “Celebici Trial Chamber Judgment”]; Prosecutor v. 
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A (Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-
e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “Celebici Appeals Chamber Judgment”]. 
 128. See supra note 37. 
 129. U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 states 
the commander is . . . responsible if he had actual knowledge or should have had knowledge, 
through reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject 
to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to use the 
means at his disposal to insure compliance with the law of war. 
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, LAW OF LAND WARFARE, ch. 8, § II, para. 501 
(1956). 
 130. See, e.g., Smidt, supra note 4, at 186–201 (discussing the court martial of Captain Ernest 
Medina). 
 131. The Celebici Appeals Chamber determined that, for the doctrine of command responsibility 
to be applicable, it is necessary to show “that a superior had some general information in his 
possession, which would put him on notice of possible unlawful acts.” Celebici Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, supra note 127, para. 238. 
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While control can be either de jure or de facto in nature, it is an element of 
command responsibility that is unclear and may hinder its application.132 
Finally, there is an issue of a changing standard for military and civilian 
authorities. The Rome Statute, for the first time, codified a bifurcation of 
the doctrine that holds civilians to a higher mens rea than military 
commanders.133 This could be problematic when determining whether to 
consider a government official in the Department of Defense a military 
commander or a civilian. However, in the case of Guantanamo and 
Afghanistan, where there is clear evidence of a government and military 
policy approving the use of torture during detainee interrogations, the 
doctrine of command responsibility could be an appropriate means of 
pursuing prosecutions. With regard to Iraq, the application would 
encounter greater difficulties; therefore, this Note asserts that the theory of 
liability, arising from a joint criminal enterprise is the most suitable 
method for pursing prosecutions in Iraq.  
B. Joint Criminal Enterprise  
The next and most appropriate method for holding high ranking 
military and government officials liable for the torture in Iraq is the theory 
of joint criminal enterprise.134 This theory “makes convictions possible 
where command responsibility or direct individual responsibility might 
fall short.”135 To apply this theory, it must be determined that the accused 
“entered into a common plan with others to accomplish an illegal objective 
 132. In the Celebici Appeals Chamber Judgment, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that 
“effective control has been accepted . . . as a standard for the purposes of determining superior 
responsibility” and “the showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de 
facto superiors . . .” although “the degree of control wielded by a de jure or de facto superior may take 
different forms, a de facto superior must be found to wield substantially similar powers of control over 
subordinates to be held criminally responsible for their acts.” Id. paras. 196–97. 
 133. Articles 28(1) and 28(2) of the Rome Statute bifurcate the doctrine of command 
responsibility. The non-military commander will only be held liable if he “consciously disregarded” 
information that clearly indicated the possibility of violations, while the military commander will be 
held liable if he “had reason to know” of the possibility of violations. Rome Statute, supra note 37, 
arts. 28(1), (2). 
 134. For recent case law on the theory of joint criminal enterprise from the ICTY, see Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-
e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “Tadic Trial Judgment”]; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1 (July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm (last visited Nov. 
21, 2004) [hereinafter “Tadic Appeals Judgment”]; Kvocka, supra note 68; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case 
No. IT-98-33 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “Krstic”]. 
 135. Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy 
Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 33 (2003). 
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and could therefore be held responsible for the criminal actions of all other 
participants in the enterprise advancing that common purpose if he knew 
or could have reasonably foreseen those actions.”136 In other words, it is “a 
way of imputing guilt to a person who participates in a form of collective 
criminal activity.”137 It may be helpful to consider the theory of joint 
criminal enterprise liability as akin to more traditional forms of 
accomplice liability,138 and recall that “most jurisdictions have developed 
at least some principles that cover group-based criminality, even if they do 
not go so far as the kind of joint criminal enterprise theory”139 discussed in 
this Note. 
There is a growing body of case law on joint criminal enterprise 
coming from the ICTY.140 The ICTY has determined that “there is no 
necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged 
or formulated . . . the common plan or purpose may materialize 
extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons 
acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.”141 Moreover, a 
defendant’s alleged participation “need not involve commission of a 
specific crime . . . (for example, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), 
but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of 
the common plan or purpose.”142 Liability for crimes that occur during the 
execution of a common plan, but which were not agreed to as part of the 
plan, is only imputed when “(i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might 
 136. Patricia M. Wald, General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 445, 457 (2003). 
 137. William A. Schabas, Symposium: The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major 
Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade: Mens Rea and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2003). 
 138. In the words of one commentator, 
in the United States, for example, although traditional notions of common law accomplice 
liability require an aider and abettor to share the intent of the principal to commit a particular 
crime, many states have increasingly moved away from this rule even as regards non-group 
based crimes, holding that an aider and abettor has vicarious liability, not only for the offense 
he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also for any reasonably foreseeable offense 
committed by the person he aids and abets. This line of reasoning, which has been widely 
followed, suggests at least some jurisdictions will impose criminal responsibility where a 
defendant has set in motion a particular chain of events that takes a bad, but clearly 
foreseeable, turn. 
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al. (Trial Chamber Judgment, Nov. 2, 2001) 
Commentary 22 (June 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (citing Hicks v. United 
States, 150 U.S. 442 (1893); People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 231 Cal. Rpt. 832 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 139. Sadat, supra note 138, at 24. 
 140. See supra note 134. 
 141. Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 134, para. 227(ii). 
 142. Id. para. 227(iii). 
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be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused 
willingly took that risk.”143 Therefore, in order to utilize the theory of joint 
criminal enterprise to hold individuals other than the “aberrant 
individuals” liable for the torture that may have occurred in Iraq, it is 
necessary to show that there was a common plan that was intended to 
achieve an illegal objective, that the use of torture in detainee 
interrogations was foreseeable, and that the risk of torture occurring was 
taken willingly. 
In the case of Iraq there are several illegal actions that could 
conceivably constitute part of a common plan. However, only one of the 
illegal actions would serve as the basis for a joint criminal enterprise. Yet, 
an understanding of each action shows the utilization of torture to have 
been foreseeable. 
First, the U.S. invasion of Iraq for the purposes of bringing about a 
regime change was illegal and prohibited under international law.144 
 143. Id. para. 228. 
 144. While many treaties have been instrumental in establishing and developing international law, 
the focal point of international law that governs the interaction of nations is the U.N. Charter. The 
United Nations was established at the end of World War II to assist the Member States to “practice 
tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.” U.N. Charter pmbl., para. 2. 
This was to be done in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” U.N. Charter 
pmbl., para. 1. Thus, all Member States were required to “settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” U.N. 
Charter art. 2, para. 3 Therefore, the U.N. Charter mandates that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Article 1 of the U.N. Charter espouses that the purposes of the 
U.N. include: 
maintain[ing] international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.  
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 Moreover, the United Nations is meant “[t]o be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in 
the attainment of [its purposes].” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 4. By embracing the notion that measures 
be taken by “collective” action, the international community is holding that threats to the peace and 
any action taken in response to such threats must be determined as a united body, not by individual 
nations taking unilateral action. Article 33 of the U.N. Charter is explicit in the duties of member 
nations, who, in order to settle disputes, must “seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.” U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. The United Nations was and is 
meant to be the means through which the nations of the world reach peaceful resolutions for disputes 
that arise amongst them.  
 Only the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, in accordance with chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter, may authorize armed force. In requiring that armed force be taken only after the 
authorization of the Security Council, the United Nations is working to keep its member nations from 
taking action that would be contrary to international law. Moreover, member nations “agree to accept 
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Without specific authorization to use force granted by the Security 
Council of the United Nations,145 any use of force by the United States 
against a sovereign state is illegal unless the force is utilized in self-
defense.146 As a result of the invasion, the United States operated 
understaffed and poorly supervised detention centers in Iraq.147 
The illegal act that provides the basis for a joint criminal enterprise was 
the operation of detention centers in a manner incapable of providing for 
the humane treatment of the detainees.148 Thus, any crimes that were 
foreseeable and willingly risked and which arose during the operation of 
the detention centers could be attributed to all involved in the operation of 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the . . . Charter.” U.N. Charter 
art. 25. Therefore, the U.N. Charter, as the supreme international treaty, carrying the same force as the 
U.S. Constitution governs the use of any armed force by the United States. 
 145. The Security Council is the body of the United Nations enabled to determine the existence of 
threats to, or breaches of, the peace and tasked with shaping the course of action for responding in a 
manner to preserve or restore peace. U.N. Charter art. 39. The measures to which the Security Council 
may resort are enumerated in articles 41, and 42 of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council is allowed 
to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call upon the Member of the United Nations to give effect to its decisions.” U.N. 
Charter art. 41. Furthermore, if the Security Council “should . . . consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter 
art. 42. Only if preventative measures utilized under article 41 are deemed to be ineffective by the 
Security Council can the Security Council permit the use of armed force.  
 The construction of articles 39, 41 and 42 is important. In essence, articles 41 and 42 provide that 
the Security Council “may” institute measures of either a non-military or military nature to preserve 
and/or restore peace. These measures are left to the discretion of the Security Council, except for the 
fact that military measures cannot be utilized until the Security Council determines that non-military 
measures are ineffective. The use of “should” at the beginning of article 42 emphasizes that, if the use 
of force is sought, the Security Council must make a decision that article 41 measures have proved to 
be ineffective. Without such a decision, no resort to armed force may be made. No other body of the 
United Nations or any other government or international organization is granted the authority to 
legally authorize the use of force that is provided to the Security Council in article 42.  
 The wording of article 42 provides for three options. First, the Security Council can determine that 
the measures instituted in article 41 are effective and therefore no armed force is necessary. Second, 
the Security Council can find that the measures undertaken through article 41 are ineffective, but the 
use of force is not yet authorized. Finally, the Security Council can decide that article 41 measures are 
ineffective and then decide to mandate the use of force as necessary to restore peace. Thus, the use of 
force requires a preliminary finding by the Security Council that article 41 measures are inadequate 
followed by an authorization to use force. 
 146. However, there is one exception to the limits placed on a nation’s ability to use armed force. 
This single exception is that nations have the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, it is apparent from the plain language of the U.N. Charter that the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq could only be considered a legal use of force if it was authorized to do so by the Security Council 
or if it was, individually or collectively, attacked by Iraq, which it was not. 
 147. See supra note 91. 
 148. Id. For international criminal case law detailing how the establishment and operation of a 
detention facility can constitute a joint criminal enterprise, see Kvocka, supra note 68. 
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the detention centers.149 Therefore, liability would go beyond the soldiers 
located within the cellblocks of Abu Ghraib prison and would extend up 
the political and military chain of command to, among others, the Joint 
Chiefs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.150 
The remaining illegal action was the development of the illegal 
interrogation methods utilized by U.S. military and contractors.151 These 
interrogation techniques were developed in an attempt to contravene 
international and domestic laws regarding the use of torture.152 While these 
techniques were intended solely for use in Guantanamo, they migrated 
from Guantanamo to Iraq.153 The development of illegal interrogation 
methods causes the use of such methods to be foreseeable. With the 
flexibility of the modern day army and the ease with which personnel can 
be transferred from one posting to another, it is entirely foreseeable that 
detention methods utilized in one locale will be utilized in another locale. 
This is especially true when soldiers from Guantanamo were transferred to 
Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of training others in interrogation 
techniques.154 Furthermore, by developing these techniques in the first 
place, the Department of Defense showed its willingness to utilize torture 
and, thus, accepted the risk that they might be utilized elsewhere. 
Therefore, all persons involved in the operation of Abu Ghraib should be 
held accountable for the torture that occurred during the operation of this 
joint criminal enterprise, as the use of torture was foreseeable and 
willingly risked. 
CONCLUSION 
The operation of Abu Ghraib was a joint criminal enterprise. Torture is 
illegal. The utilization of torture in Iraq was foreseeable. The risk of 
torture being utilized in Iraq was taken willingly as evidenced by the use 
of government-sanctioned torture in Afghanistan and Guantanamo and the 
government-ordered transfer of interrogators from Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo to Iraq for the purposes of conducting interrogations and 
training others in interrogation techniques. In addition to providing the 
 149. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 116. 
 151. Recall that an analysis of the interrogation methods utilized is beyond the scope of the Note 
and that it is being assumed that certain techniques rise to the level of torture. See supra Part I 
(discussing the illegality of torture). 
 152. See supra Parts I, II, and III. 
 153. See supra notes 88, 89. 
 154. Id. 
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basis for a joint criminal enterprise, the failure of the U.S. government to 
ensure that its detention centers were being operated in a manner that 
prevented over-crowding and facilitated the humane treatment of detainees 
further accentuates the government’s willingness to risk the use of torture 
by guards trained in torture techniques and were operating in a highly 
stressful environment.  
No credible justification has been proffered for the legitimization of 
either the use of torture or the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent 
operation of detention centers.155 War crimes and crimes against humanity 
have occurred and the responsibility extends beyond the low level soldiers 
currently charged with these crimes. With international and domestic law 
being violated at the highest levels of the military and political hierarchy, 
the prosecution of only low-ranking soldiers and military police is 
inexcusable. The doctrine of command responsibility provides a solid 
theory of individual criminal liability through which prosecutions can be 
attempted for any torture that may have occurred in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo. However, the theory of joint criminal enterprise provides the 
best means for pursuing prosecutions that arise out of the events in Iraq. 
The continued development of the theories of command responsibility and 
joint criminal enterprise is necessary to continue combating the prevalence 
of collective violence currently occurring around the globe. 
Damien S. Donnelly-Cole* 
 155. An analysis of the proffered justifications for the invasion of Iraq is beyond the scope of this 
note. Rather, the plain interpretation of the U.N. Charter in notes 116–118, combined with reliance 
upon the determination of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the invasion was illegal under the 
U.N. Charter is sufficient. See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2004, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005). For an in-depth 
analysis, see Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004). 
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